700M VPN Users at Risk: Hidden Ownership Exposed

When you connect to a virtual private network, you probably assume your online activity is private and secure. The reality is messier.

Multiple studies reveal that over 20 popular VPN apps with more than 700 million users are secretly connected through overlapping ownership groups, sharing vulnerabilities that could expose your data. Worse, half of the top 10 most popular VPNs are vulnerable to interception attacks that can gut their security promises.

The broader cybersecurity picture shows systematic flaws in how VPN services are designed, operated, and marketed.

The hidden web of VPN ownership nobody talks about

The cybersecurity community took notice when researchers at The Citizen Lab traced seemingly independent VPN apps back to just three families of providers. Not fringe players either. We are talking about hundreds of millions of downloads behind brands that look unrelated while sharing critical infrastructure.

Family A includes major apps like Turbo VPN, VPN Proxy Master, and Snap VPN, which share near-identical code, libraries, and assets despite appearing separate on app stores. Forensic work showed identical AES-192-ECB encryption for configuration files and the same hard-coded Shadowsocks passwords stored in files named “server_offline.ser.”

Family B operates XY VPN, 3X VPN, and Melon VPN using the same VPN addresses and infrastructure, with matching native libraries, libcore.so, and 14 hard-coded passwords across their supposedly different services. Family C controls Fast Potato VPN and X-VPN through shared proprietary protocols disguised on port 53, normally used for DNS.

This is not just a false sense of choice. When multiple services reuse the same cryptographic keys and infrastructure, a single compromise can hit millions of users at once. Researchers showed this cross-contamination by using extracted Shadowsocks credentials from one app to connect to different providers’ servers.

The obfuscation around ownership makes it worse. Business filings revealed apps claiming to operate from Singapore that actually trace back to China, contradicting public claims. Some apps were even linked to Chinese firm Qihoo 360, a company sanctioned by the US government for connections to the People’s Liberation Army.

How attackers can intercept your ‘secure’ VPN traffic

The most dangerous bugs live on the server side, where users have no visibility.

Port Shadow attacks exploit weaknesses in connection tracking frameworks that many VPN servers rely on to route packets. With the right timing, adversaries can redirect communications, scan ports, strip away tunnel encryption, and eavesdrop without owning a router.

Here is the gist. The server’s connection tracking system manages how packets flow between your device and the internet. Poor configuration creates small windows where attackers can tamper with routing before the intended encryption layer kicks in.

These flaws live in server software, so clients have no defense. Protection depends on VPN operators using proper configurations, including separating the IPs used for client connections from server egress traffic.

All three VPN families were vulnerable to blind on-path attacks, where an adversary on the same network can infer active connections despite tunnel encryption. These issues stem from misconfigurations in libraries like libredsocks.so that interact poorly with Android’s connection tracking. Some apps reused ShadowSocks login credentials, and others relied on RC4-MD5 cipher suites that were deprecated in 2020 and are susceptible to confirmation and key recovery attacks.

The problem is not limited to phones. Recent research found that 126 VPN clients, 64.6%, are vulnerable to routing table manipulation attacks that leak traffic outside the tunnel, and none of the tested providers were secure across all platforms. The weak point is the routing exceptions VPN clients create for local access and server communications.

The data leak crisis hiding in plain sight

It is not just targeted interception. Systematic data leakage shows up across the market. A comprehensive study found 53% of paid Android VPN apps leak user data, with 16 of 30 analyzed VPNs exhibiting some form of leakage despite charging for stronger security.

The standout failure was lack of SNI encryption, present in half the tested VPNs. Server Name Indication leaks reveal which websites you try to reach before the VPN fully connects, effectively broadcasting usage patterns to observers. That is a gift to surveillance systems that map user behavior even when content stays encrypted.

DNS leaks affected seven VPN apps under certain network conditions, and 23% used third-party DNS servers that enable outside monitoring of browsing patterns. When DNS requests escape the tunnel, they form a searchable log of activity that can be aligned with timing and traffic volume.

Even worse, FastestVPN was observed exposing users’ email addresses in headers of unencrypted requests to geolocation APIs.

Shared infrastructure magnifies the damage. Multiple providers rely on third-party public DNS, 29 providers in that dataset, and traffic leaks during tunnel failure affected 26 VPN providers. The worst leaks happen during outages and transitions, exactly when you expect protection to hold.

What this means for your digital privacy

The evidence points to a chain of avoidable mistakes. Hard-coded Shadowsocks passwords embedded in APKs let attackers extract symmetric keys and decrypt traffic at scale. The playbook is known: decompile the app, pull encrypted configuration files, use hard-coded AES keys to decrypt Shadowsocks credentials, then walk straight into server infrastructure.

It gets worse when weak ciphers linger. Several apps still use RC4-MD5 for Shadowsocks without proper IV protection, exposing traffic to well-documented cryptographic attacks. Combine that with shared credentials and one compromised key can unlock communications across multiple brands.

There is a sliver of good news. The most common VPNs, NordVPN, ExpressVPN, and Surfshark, are not vulnerable to Port Shadow attacks, which shows that mature providers with dedicated security teams can harden their servers. VPN providers using multi-hop configurations are also generally protected against this specific routing manipulation.

If you are looking beyond commercial options, researchers suggest alternatives like Tor or self-hosted VPNs. Self-hosting cuts out the provider, but it makes your traffic the only flow entering or leaving your server, which can enable traffic correlation.

Time to rethink your VPN strategy

The research exposes a basic information gap in the VPN market.

App stores have limited ability to verify operators or audit security, since reviews focus on malware, not end-to-end configurations. The result is a marketplace where you are asked to make high-stakes choices without the technical details needed to judge real protection.

Do not accept vibes and marketing. Check with your VPN provider about mitigation against Port Shadow and similar attacks, including whether client connection IPs are segregated from server egress traffic. Ask for proof of regular independent audits that examine client software, server infrastructure, and network configuration.

Look for transparent ownership. Avoid providers that share infrastructure, encryption keys, or management systems with other services. Verify current encryption standards, documented key rotation, and server hardening. Press for details on routing table management, DNS resolution, and how the service handles tunnel failure.

The cybersecurity community is pushing for structural fixes, with researchers suggesting mandatory security audit badges for VPN apps and identity verification badges for developers. Until that exists, your best protection is choosing providers with proven security track records, documented practices, and real transparency about operations and ownership.

Bottom line, VPNs can deliver real privacy, but only when they are implemented correctly and operated honestly. The landscape demands that users play the skeptic, not the passenger. Your privacy is worth the extra questions.