Happy New Year. It’s now 2007 and what do we have to show for it? Seriously, what substantive progress can we point to in the world of Information Security? A couple mergers and acquisitions, but how about real progress? Surely, our adversaries seem to be making progress in leaps and bounds, but what about us?
So, in keeping with my own tradition, I’m not going to recap 2006 or predict what’s to come in 2007 and beyond (my crystal ball is rebooting). Instead, I’m just going to touch on a few topics here that are—or should be—important to us all. In the aggregate, they speak to both the past as well as to our future…maybe.
Here’s my 2007 list, in no particular order:
The DRM war is lost, but the battles rage on. There’s a common denominator in all forms of digital information representation that stops the DRM war dead in its tracks—the analog playback device. As long as we use our eyes and ears to play back digital information, we’re going to fail in protecting digital media. Why? Well, because the adversary can always intercept the plaintext signal in the “final millimeter.” When playing music, for example, the adversary can virtualize a computer and intercept the sound signal as it goes to the virtual speakers. Voila, any and every DRM scheme has just been circumvented.
Same thing goes for movies, digital books, etc. Until and unless the producers of these products come to terms with that, they’re going to continue battling in vain in a war that can’t possibly be won. How about making things so easy that it’s not worth the hassle of copying things, guys?
So what’s the big deal? Well, although the war can’t be won, there are losers too many to mention, starting with you and me. Why can’t I put a USB stick into my TiVo and take a show that I recorded to a friend’s house to watch? Most likely answer: DRM. Why can’t I download a DVD from (say) Netflix, burn it to disk, and watch it on my DVD player? Most likely answer: DRM. You get the picture–we all lose because technology advances are being hampered by DRM paranoia.
Surely the technology for cool features like these has been available for some time—often via “underground” groups and such. Surely the TiVo and Netflix guys and gals thought of these things years ago.
PKI: Where’s the I?
There’s (still) no “I” in PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). I recently did a architectural security review of a major credit card processing application for one of my customers. In it, I applauded their use of an internal PKI to rigorously mutually authenticate all of the system’s components to one another. However, years after PKI started appearing, there’s still no infrastructurein PKI. Those that are using PKI technologies continue to run in their own islands, with few exceptions. Granted, some of those islands are approaching the size of a small continent, but the best that an end consumer has available today is still pathetically lacking.
About a year ago, I announced here in my column that I was going to start signing all my emails using PGP (Pretty Good Privacy, an encryption program). Well, I’m indeed doing that, but it has generated more confusion than security, quite honestly. Although I haven’t given up on it yet, I’m pretty close to concluding that it was a failed (albeit highly unscientific) experiment. Yes, I know that PGP isn’t really a PKI to begin with, but it presents many of the components of a PKI in an inexpensive or even free manner to the end user—all the more reason for being disappointed by my experiment’s failure.
Next page: Mac/Linux security vs. Windows
Mac, Linux and Windows Security
What’s different about OS X? This past year was a major one for my small business, as I switched from a Linux desktop to an Apple OS X desktop. Truth be told, I never had much respect for Macs (and that’s an understatement), but then Mr. Jobs came along and put BSD UNIX under the hood and my attitude shifted. I’ve been using various UNIXes since the early 1980s and have always just felt “at home” there.
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I also feel more secure, but what really makes them different than Microsoft’s offerings from a security perspective? I’m going to explore this question more in my columns this year, but I have a few preliminary thoughts: 1) Applications are in the /Applications folder, where my desktop user has no write access to; 2) user application data, options, settings, etc., are stored in each user’s home directory; and 3) my desktop user has no system privileges (though that wasn’t an Apple default!).
I know these are nothing new—mainframe folks have known about this stuff for decades. They’ve taken the Redmond crowd a long time to catch on to, however. Try logging into a default XP desktop user sometime and deleting all the files in say Program Files or Windows sometime just for fun, and see what happens. (No, don’t really do this!) Indeed, I still have numerous applications loaded on my old XP laptop that require write access to Windows to store configuration settings and such. How can you ever hope to be secure in such an environment?
Email: Guilty Until Proven Otherwise
Delete emails with wanton abandon. Between the rise in spam emails and phishing attacks—which often go hand in hand—it’s time to switch to a whitelist approach when handling emails. That is, much like setting firewall rules, we have to assume everything to be deadly dangerous until we prove it to be safe, not the other way around. When I go through my inbox each day, I look through the senders and subject lines for people that I know and subjects that mean something in the context that I expect; all else gets deleted. Seriously. No previews. No clicking on emails that might be interesting. Sorry. There’s a serious risk that I’ll miss something that I shouldn’t have, but that’s the cost of doing safe email in 2007.
So that’s my little list of things to consider as we look forward to 2007 and all that it holds in store for us. Apart from anything else, we’ve got to realize that the for-profit attacks have upped the ante on us and we simply must find ways of doing our work better.